Quotes – Krytyczność

“In my view, one of the simplest yet most accurate and effective definitions of the critical attitude underpinning criticism is that it is a posture of vigilant maintenance of a state of crisis. I understand crisis in its most fundamental sense, stripped of evaluative connotations: crisis is a decisive, pivotal period—a turning point, rupture, or breakdown in the existing trajectory of development. Crisis and criticism are dialectically intertwined—both positively (as they point to the functions of differentiation and decision) and negatively, where criticism serves as an antidote to crisis, and crisis generates the need for criticism. Yet, it is precisely crisis that can act as an antidote to the deficiency or absence of criticism, just as criticism can provoke crisis.”

(Dariusz Kubok, Krytycyzm, sceptycyzm i zetetycyzm we wczesnej filozofii greckiej [Criticism, Scepticism, and Zeteticism in Early Greek Philosophy], Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2021, p. 27)

“The critical attitude characterizes humans in their relationship with the world, including themselves. It enables the recognition of cognitive conditions and limitations, the modes of accepting and justifying assertions, the principles guiding specific attitudes, and the foundations of action. Criticism can also be associated with an ethical attitude that assumes freedom and responsibility, facilitated by the comprehensive, multi-faceted consideration of social phenomena. In a world where retreating into dogmatic postures is quite common, the critical attitude may prove not only necessary but highly desirable on a broad, universal level. It is worth cultivating criticism before we reach a critical deficit of criticism.”

“An essential component of this critical attitude should also be the zetetic posture, understood as the capacity to sustain patient hope while resisting the temptation of definitive resolutions.”

“The object isn’t to make art, it’s to be in that wonderful state which makes art inevitable.”

(Robert Henri, cited in Rick Rubin, The Creative Act: A Way of Being)

“Like ‘fanaticism,’ dogmatism is ordinarily a term of abuse, and a term one doesn’t apply to oneself. […] The term has a variety of analogically related uses. In one use, to say of someone that she is a dogmatist is to say that she holds her views more strongly than is appropriate, more strongly than the evidence warrants, for example; alternatively, it is to say that she holds her views uncritically, without paying sufficient heed to objections and alternatives, or to the limitations of human reason (see Kant). ‘Dogmatism’ is therefore an indexical term; whether you properly apply it to a given doctrine or belief depends upon where you yourself stand.”

(Plantinga, “Dogmatism,” in: A Companion to Epistemology, ed. J. Dancy, E. Sosa, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992, pp. 108–109)

“Thus—in my view—the goal is to resist both narrowing the field of inquiry and restricting the perspective of observation while allowing for alternative perspectives and narratives. It is worth highlighting the emerging attitude of philosophical philoxenia, which is closely (and, indeed, necessarily) tied to historical-philosophical philoxenia; together, they stand in opposition to egotistical attitudes that reject all unfamiliar methods of philosophical thought. This aspect is closely related to the issue of criticism, which will be further discussed.”

(Dariusz Kubok, ” Andrzeja Norasa kłopoty z filozofią i historią filozofii.” [Andrzej Noras’s Troubles with Philosophy and the History of Philosophy,] Ruch Filozoficzny 2021, Vol. 77, No. 2, p. 179)

“This is how one needs to think about philosophizing in its most profound dimension: Eros is philosophy, and therefore philosophy is a here-and-now desire, a present longing, and search for objects indicated before. As such, it is not primarily about fulfilment or non-fulfilment: a desiring subject does not desire his object because he knows that his desire will be fulfilled or because he knows that his desire will not be fulfilled. Such putative knowledge adds nothing to his desire, nor does it diminish it. Admittedly, however, rather than in the perspective of loving zeteticism, both in the past and today people prefer to think of philosophy in terms of fulfilment, which drives them into positions of dogmatism (whether positive or negative). In contrast, the zetetic understanding of philosophy is anti-dogmatic and therefore critical; it does not focus on prejudging the effect of the search but on the complexity, scope, profundity, and scrupulousness of the search itself. Walking the dogmatic path resembles sailing the narrow strait between Scylla and Charybdis”.

(Dariusz Kubok, The Topographies of the Philosophical Path, or on the Consequences of Not Wearing Shoes. “Er(r)go. Teoria–Literatura–Kultura” 2021, Nr / No. 43 (2/2021), s. 269.)

“Venturing towards the other may transform us into others, as eidetic journeying challenges us to shift and transcend boundaries. In our own travels, we should be guided by the desire to establish otherness not just as difference, but also as a quality of openness towards diversity and alterity. Primarily, an eidetically conceived journey will be tantamount to deepened forms of discovery, listening closely to new questions and uncovering new perspectives upon the world. Such a journey comes to be elevated to the rank of philosophy, and philosophy—shedding its potential dogmatism—can rise to the level of a journey oriented towards conversional-eidetic ends”.

(Dariusz Kubok, Philosophy of / as a Journey. „Forum Philosophicum” 29 (2024) no. 1, s. 25.)

“Philosophy, in its original dimension, represents an articulated freedom that expresses its radical nature. Politics, on the other hand, condemned to immediacy—or at least tending in that direction—and tainted by pragmatic calculation, typically opts for ellipsis; it can thus be understood as constrained omission.”

(Dariusz Kubok, ” Filozofia a polityka. Lekcje z Oakeshotta, Bradatana i Sokratesa” [Philosophy and Politics: Lessons from Oakeshott, Bradatan, and Socrates],” Horyzonty Polityki 2022, Vol. 13, No. 45, p. 199)

In an attempt to outline the essence of the critical attitude, J. Pelc presents a series of oppositions, where the first term in each pair highlights the qualities of being critical:

“In the intellectual sphere: antidogmatic – dogmatic, inquirer – believer, skeptical (in the common sense of the term, derived from skeptomai, meaning ‘to examine, to reflect’) – gullible, inquisitive – spontaneous, antirational – irrational, intellectual – emotional, objective – subjective, distanced from the subject – engaged, reserved – uninhibited, mature – naive, prudent – reckless, considerate – hasty, reasonable – unreasonable, expert – amateur, intellectually disciplined – chaotic, possessing logical culture – devoid of logical culture.
In the linguistic sphere, dependent on intellectual capacity: linguistically cultured
– linguistically inept, expressing oneself clearly and adequately
– committing logical linguistic errors.
In the practical sphere, dependent on intellectual capacity: observant – distracted, insightful – superficial, precise – imprecise, meticulous – careless.

In the moral sphere, which conditions the realization of criticality in actions and outcomes: principled – opportunistic, fair – biased, courageous – cowardly.

(J. Pelc, “Krytyka i krytycyzm w nauce,” [Critique and Criticism in Scholarship and Science] in Krytyka i krytycyzm w nauce, ed. H. Żytkowicz, Warszawa: Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej, 1998, p. 17)